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A Note on “Confidentiality-Preserving Image Search: A
Comparative Study Between Homomorphic Encryption and
Distance-Preserving Randomization”
Zhengjun Cao1 and Lihua Liu2
Abstract. Recently, Lu et al. have proposed two image search schemes based on
additive homomorphic encryption [IEEE Access, 2 (2014), 125-141]. We remark that
both two schemes are flawed because: (1) the first scheme does not make use of the
additive homomorphic property at all; (2) the additive homomorphic encryption in
the second scheme is unnecessary and can be replaced by a more efficient symmetric
key encryption.
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1 Introduction
Recently, Lu et al. [1] have discussed how existing additive homomorphic encryption can
be potentially used for image search, and proposed two confidentiality-preserving image search
schemes based on Paillier’s encryption [2]. In the proposed model, a client has many images who
wants to store the image data online for convenient data access anywhere anytime. The client
has to encrypt each image and its features and upload the encrypted data to a cloud server. In
this note, we remark that the Lu et al.’s schemes are flawed.
2 Review of the Lu et al.’s schemes
In the schemes [1], the features of each image are encrypted by any additively homomorphic
encryption such as Paillier’s cryptosystem [2], which can be described as follows. Pick an RSA
modulus n = pq. Set λ = lcm(p−1, q−1). Select g ∈ Z∗
n2
such that n | ordn2(g). Publish n, g and
keep λ in secret. For m ∈ Zn, pick r ∈ Zn, compute the ciphertext c = E(m) = g
mrnmodn2.
Recover m = D(c) =
(
cλ−1modn2
n
)
/
(
gλ−1modn2
n
)
modn.
Denote the encrypting function and decrypting function of AES by E(·) and D(·), and that
of Paillier’s cryptosystem by E(·) and D(·), respectively. See Table 1 and Table 2 for the details
of the two image search schemes.
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Table 1: The Lu et al.’s scheme 1
Client Server
Encrypt the image P (i) and its
feature vector f(i) ∈ Rt as
E(f(i)) = (E(f
(i)
1 ), · · · , E(f
(i)
t )) Store the encrypted
and E(P (i)). Upload them.
{i,E(f(i)),E(P (i))}
−−−−−−−−−−−→
i=1,··· ,N
images and features.
Given an image Q and its
feature vector q, ask for
all the encrypted features.
Request
−−−−−→
{i,E(f(i))}
←−−−−−−
i=1,··· ,N
Return all encrypted features.
Compute f(i) = D(E(f(i))) and
the L2 distance di =‖ f
(i) − q ‖,
i = 1, · · · , N . Send
I = {j | dj ≤ λ}, where λ is
a fault-tolerant parameter.
I
−−→
Recover all
{E(P (k))}
←−−−−−−
k∈I
Return all E(P (k)), k ∈ I.
P (k) = D(E(P (k))), k ∈ I.
Table 2: The Lu et al.’s scheme 2
Client Server
Encrypt the image P (i) and its
feature vector f(i) ∈ Rt as
E(f(i)) = (E(f
(i)
1 ), · · · , E(f
(i)
t ))
and E(P (i)). Compute Store the encrypted
χi = E
(
Σtℓ=1(f
(i)
ℓ )
2
)
. Upload them.
{i,χi,E(f
(i)),E(P (i))}
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
i=1,··· ,N
images and features.
Given an image Q and Compute
its feature vector q, hi =
(∏t
ℓ=1(E(f
(i)
ℓ ))
qℓ
)−2
send q to the server.
q
−−→ ·E
(
Σtℓ=1q
2
ℓ
)
· χi,
i = 1, · · · , N.
Compute di = D(hi),
hi,i=1,··· ,N
←−−−−−−− Send them back.
i = 1, · · · , N . Randomly
pick a set Î ⊂ {1, · · · , N}
of an appropriate size.
Set I ′ = Î
⋃
I where
I = {j | dj ≤ λ, 1 ≤ j ≤ N},
λ is a fault-tolerant parameter.
I′
−−→
Recover all images
{E(P (k))}
←−−−−−−
k∈I′
Return all E(P (k)), k ∈ I ′.
P (k) = D(E(P (k))), k ∈ I.
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Notice that, by the additive homomorphic property of Paillier’s encryption, we have
E
(
‖f(i) − q‖2
)
= E
(
Σtℓ=1(f
(i)
ℓ − qℓ)
2
)
= E
(
Σtℓ=1(f
(i)
ℓ )
2 − 2Σtℓ=1f
(i)
ℓ qℓ +Σ
t
ℓ=1q
2
ℓ
)
= E
(
Σtℓ=1(f
(i)
ℓ )
2
)
· E
(
−2Σtℓ=1f
(i)
ℓ qℓ
)
· E
(
Σtℓ=1q
2
ℓ
)
= χi ·
(
t∏
ℓ=1
(E(f
(i)
ℓ ))
qℓ
)−2
· E
(
Σtℓ=1q
2
ℓ
)
= hi,
di = D(hi) = D
(
E(‖f(i) − q‖2)
)
= ‖f(i) − q‖2.
3 Analysis of the Lu et al.’s schemes
We now show that the Lu et al.’s schemes are flawed.
(1) The authors [1] have confused the general arithmetic over the field R and the modular
arithmetic over the domain Zn. In fact, the correctness of the schemes are based on
f(i) = D(E(f(i))), ‖f(i) − q‖2 = D
(
E(‖f(i) − q‖2)
)
.
The equations hold on the condition that f(i) and ‖f(i)−q‖2 are in the underlying domain
Zn of Paillier’s encryption. That means a visual feature vector f ∈ R
t must be transformed
into f˜ ∈ Ztn. But the authors [1] have not specified this process.
By the way, there is a typo in the description of the decrypting equation of Paillier’s cryp-
tosystem (see Ref.[1], page 128). It should be m =
(
cλ−1modn2
n
)
/
(
gλ−1modn2
n
)
modn,
not m =
(
cλ−1modn2
n
)
/
(
gλ−1modn2
n
)
modn2.
(2) In the scheme 1, both the client and the server do not make use of the additive homomorphic
property of Paillier’s encryption at all. The related computations for the client are
f(i) = D(E(f(i))), i = 1, · · · , N.
Actually, the process has no relation to the additive homomorphic property. Thus, in
the scheme the Paillier’s public key encryption can be reasonably replaced by the more
efficient symmetric key encryption AES.
It seems that the authors [1] have not realized that the computational performance of
public-key encryption is inferior to that of symmetric-key encryption. For example, the
authors wrote [1] “image encryption can be done using state-of-the-art ciphers such as AES
or RSA by treating images as ordinary data”. We here would like to stress that images
should be encrypted by a symmetric key encryption, instead of any public key encryption.
In practice, RSA is usually used for encrypting session keys, not for images. Compared
with AES, RSA is fairly inefficient.
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(3) In the scheme 2, the server has to make use of the additive homomorphic property for
computing the encrypted distance hi = E
(
‖f(i) − q‖2
)
. But in such case, the client has
still to compute di = D(hi), i = 1, · · · , N , which dominate the client’s computational
cost. Compared with the revised scheme, we find, the scheme 2 has not truly mitigated
the client’s computational cost. See the Table 3 for the comparisons of the dominated
computations for the client in the three schemes.) Apparently, the revised scheme is more
efficient because it only needs to perform symmetric key decryption N + |I| times.
Table 3: The dominated computations for the client in the three schemes
Dominated computations Computational cost
Scheme 1 f(i) =
(
D(E(f
(i)
1 )), · · · ,D(E(f
(i)
t ))
)
, public key decryption: tN (times)
i = 1, · · · , N .
P (k) = D(E(P (k))), k ∈ I. symmetric key decryption: |I|
Scheme 2 di = D(hi), i = 1, · · · , N . public key decryption: N
P (k) = D(E(P (k))), k ∈ I. symmetric key decryption: |I|
The revised f(i) = D(E(f(i))), i = 1, · · · , N .
P (k) = D(E(P (k))), k ∈ I. symmetric key decryption: N + |I|
4 Conclusion
We show that the Lu et al.’s schemes for image search are flawed and somewhat misleading.
We here want to stress that the computational performance of public-key encryption is inferior
to that of symmetric-key encryption. A homomorphic encryption allows anyone to perform
some computations on encrypted data, despite not having the secret decryption key. But any
computations performed on encrypted data are constrained to the underlying domain (finite
domains). The real goal of using modular arithmetic in cryptography is to obscure and dissipate
the redundancies in a plaintext message, not to perform any numerical calculations.
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